| From
Tehelka Magazine, Vol 5, Issue 49, Dated Dec 13, 2008 |
|
| CURRENT
AFFAIRS |
|
terrorism |
|
Terror, Step By Step
Just how did ten terrorists attack multiple targets in quick succession?
RANA AYYUB captures the prolonged battle in Mumbai
IN THE end, the terror alerts stayed
on paper. The men who walked
ashore in South Mumbai’s posh
Gateway of India area in dark
clothes, need not have worried.
There was little about them — trained as
one of them now reveals to wage hightech
urban jehad and navigate the high
seas — that gave away any sign of the
high-risk task they were an hour away
from executing.
|
Terror on schedule Two terrorists captured on
camera while entering CST |
They had already set their plan into
motion when they mercilessly killed
Amar Sinh Solanki, the captain of Al
Kuber, a fishing trawler they had used to
complete the second leg of their journey
which began on November 24, 48 hours
before they drifted ashore on an
inflatable speedboat called Gemini. The
journey can be pieced through the
account of Kasav, the class four dropout
from Pakistan’s Punjab; the short, young
face captured by CCTV cameras. Kasav
and nine others — who were subsequently
to be killed — sailed from Azizabad
in Karachi on a small ship and soon
hopped on to Al Husseini, a Pakistani
vessel stationed about 200 nautical miles
from the port of Karachi. Kuber was the
next vessel they hopped on to, to close
in on Mumbai; the terror destination
they had been trained to attack. En
route, four of Solanki’s colleagues were
killed and thrown into the deep circling
waters of the Arabian Sea. Whether their
bodies will ever be found is only a matter
of small detail to the investigators.
Solanki still had use for Kasav and his
men and they blindfolded him, tied his
legs and ruthlessly slit his throat
only after they could make out the
Mumbai skyline with its skyscrapers in
the distance.
They had sailed past the coast guards,
past the Naval lines of defence and now
that Mumbai was only a speedable four
to five nautical miles away, they, indeed,
had little worry. Jannat was the last stop in their motivated, indoctrinated heads
and as they walked ashore, only kilometers
away from their intended mayhem,
it was easy to brush off Ajay Mistry, one
of the many eyewitnesses of what was to
unfold for the next 60 hours.
MISTRY RECALLS seeing six men
get off at the fishermen’s coast
in the Cuffe Parade area near
Sassoon dock. He remembers them
being dressed smartly in navy blue and
black. They appeared to be in their early
twenties, like college kids, Mistry recalled.
Another eyewitness, a teenager
who came out of his house where he had
been engrossed watching the ‘gentleman’s
game’ — the India vs England
match — says there were few people
outdoors that day because of the batball
duel. He asked the young men what
they were doing there, to which one of
them said they were college students
and had just come back from a boat ride.
Another eyewitness, Anita Rajendra
Udaayar was told, “apna kaam karo” (do
your work), when she queried, asking
them what they were doing there. Men
with oversized backpacks strapped on
their backs was an unusual sight even
for the residents accustomed to tourists
taking boat rides.
Ironically, few will argue now that the
ease with which they came, undetected,
resembled a boat ride.
Mistry recalls the time he saw the
men — 8.30 pm is what he puts it at.
An hour later — in which more people
had stepped out of their homes as
diners — two gunmen with AK 47s,
deadly assault rifles that kill in bursts,
walked into the Chhatrapati Shivaji
Terminus (CST). Making no pretense
of concealing the Kalashnikovs, the
two — they now have names: Kasav and
Abu Ismail — walked on to platform
number 13, also close to the entrance of
the railway station.
CST was their first port of call and they
fired with gusto and sprayed death, firing
randomly at the passengers on the
crowded platform. Chaos ensued as
shouts, screams and wails engulfed the
platform. Those who survived the bursts
ran around in panic, not knowing what
had hit them. Anand Shelgaonkar, a
cleaner at the station, then saw one of
the two terrorists lob a hand grenade
right in the middle of the station. A
splinter or a bullet — it was too chaotic
to tell — hit the chest of a railway employee
whose job it was to announce train
arrivals and departures.
But where was the railway police? Security
at stations was supposed to have been beefed up after the serial train
blasts in Mumbai on July 11, 2006 had
killed almost a similar number — 187.
Rajendra Sadashiv, a constable who
had just come in on the night shift, now
gives an eyewitness account in answer to
that crucial question. “They looked like
army wallas. They wore dark clothers
and carried guns just like the army does,
and so no one suspected them. But when
they started firing, my senior, Inspector
Shashank Shinde, tried to counter them
and started firing at them, but they fired
back at him. He was killed on the spot.
They also fired at me and though I was
not hit, I fell down in a pool of blood. Because
of the chaos, they assumed I was
dead and went past me firing at others.
They did all this in complete silence. Nobody
uttered a word, they just coordinated
with each other through hand
movements and sign language.”
THE POLICE out of their way, the
merchants of death went about
their cold business. They had
claimed 40 lives in a matter of minutes
and it was time to move on. They had
other destinations to go to. Eleven-yearold
Vilas, who polished shoes at the station
for a living, jumped to safety behind
a board when he saw one of the terrorists
with a big gun, and realised it was
not some gangwar or underworld encounter.
This was not sniper fire. It was
coming in bursts.
Walking out of the station, Kasav and
Ismail walked past the Times of India building to enter Cama Hospital. Vilas
surveyed the scene from behind the
board. He could only see bodies, pools
of blood and heaps of clothes that had
fallen out of the passengers suitcases.
Forty deaths later, the police had not yet
arrived. The Crisis Management Group
(CMG), supposed to kick in within minutes
of an attack (during the hijacking
crisis when IC 814 finally landed in
Kandahar, the CMG had re-rehearsed the
drill after it failed to stop the plane at
Amritsar) was nowhere in evidence. The
patients — mostly women and children
— were at the mercy of the men in deep
blue and black. So were the hospital’s
security guards, who were easily felled
with bullets.
One of the terrorists — it is not clear
which one — came rushing down the
fourth floor when he was told that a
police jeep was making its way to the
hospital. This was the first sign that the
terrorists were also carrying phones
(a probe is now on on how they obtained
SIM cards which got activated so quickly.
There are conflicting reports of the SIMs having come from Vienna and New York
and another of them being from Delhi
and West Bengal.) Then, it didn’t matter
which numbers they were using. All that
mattered was that they could communicate
and so were able to shoot dead ATS
chief Hemant Karkare, encounter specialist
Vijay Salaskar and ACP Ashok
Kamte. Mumbai’s three top cops died
before they had a chance to pick up their
guns. Arun Jadhav, a constable who took
four bullets and fell down, given up as
dead, was to soon emerge as an important
eyewitness.
JADHAV TELLS a chilling account of
what the two did after throwing the
bodies of Karkare, Salaskar and
Kamte out of the Qualis in whichthey
lay slumped. According to Jadhav, who
is now recuperating in an intensive care
unit, the two took control of the vehicle
and started driving towards the Metro
theatre junction, all the time indiscriminately
firing at the people on the road.
The policemen standing on the other
side of the road initially thought that
their officers were in the Qualis; only to
realise quickly that it had been hijacked.
In the midst of the firing, there was another
loud sound — this one signaled
that the Qualis itself had a tyre burst.
Unfazed, the foot didn’t come off the accelerator
till a parked Skoda with four
men in it came in handy. Seeing the men
cocking AKs, the four leapt out of the
Skoda and offered to surrender themselves
but, Kasav and his accomplice seemed like men in a hurry. Khedkar, a
police sub-inspector was by now following
the terrorists. He quickly took the
number of the Skoda from the four who
could not believe their luck, and passed
it on to the control room. When a police
post tried to stop the car near Girgaum
Chowpatty, Ismail, who was in the driving
seat, tried taking a sharp U-turn. He
hit a median and this gave the police
their chance of finally opening up. In the
duel between the .303 and the AK 47s,
one policeman, Tukaram Umbale, was
killed and so was Ismail. According to
Khedkar, they had also assumed Kasav
to be dead, but discovered on reaching
the hospital that while he had been injured,
the bullets had only grazed him.
Kasav was to be the only one who would
survive the 60-hour battle that he had
begun at CST.
Kasav could only have wondered
about what the others — they had broken
up into pairs after getting off the
speed boat — were up to. Unknown to
him, at roughly the same time as the CST
shootout, two other gunmen were standing at the entrance to Leopold
Café, one of South Mumbai’s open air
beer and snacks joint that attracts
both locals and foreign tourists alike. It
was business as usual at the Café and a
waiter invited the two in. Their backpacks
were larger than most, but that is
now hindsight. Surveying the restaurant
that was set up way back in 1871, the two
nodded to the waiter, and seconds later,
opened fire on diners who nibbled on
food as they watched the cricket match
play itself out on television. Mehmood
Patel, who was standing outside the
Leopold, remembers the two terrorists
casually walking out of the Café and
taking the lane for Taj Hotel, only a
stone’s throw away.
CST had been hit. Maharashtra’s top
cops lay dead, their bodies strewn outside
a hospital. Kasav and Ismail had
driven around South Mumbai and now
Leopold was to count its dead. The
country’s financial capital was under
siege. Multiple targets were being hit.
Where was the police? What was their
assessment? Had somebody informed
the Home Ministry, the National Security
Advisor, the Prime Minister?
The state was not in control, the men
who had come aboard Al Kuber were.
The two who walked down the lane
to Taj were going to catch up with two
others who had already begun the dance
of death in the up-market five star hotel.
Vasant Prabhu, a Press photographer
who had come to Leopold, thinking it
was one more case of firing in a city
accustomed to underworld duels, saw
one of the terrorists entering the Taj.
He followed and found Nagre Patil, a
district commissioner of police (DCP),
entering the hotel with a bodyguard and
two security men. He recounted what
he saw, “When we reached the first floor
the terrorists had already started firing.
We somehow managed to reach the
third floor. The DCP, who had just a
service revolver, was cautious and tried
to peep over the wall from the third to
the second floor. A gunman saw us,
shouted ‘Bastards’ and opened fire. We
ducked and fell on the floor and started
creeping towards the staircase.’’
TOO MANY targets were being hit
at the same time. Also at about
9.30pm, two gunmen, one slightly
plump, threw a hand grenade at the
Bharat Petroleum gas station at
the Colaba Causeway next to the
Israeli-owned Chabad House, better
known as Nariman House. Vicky Patil,
who owns a sweet shop nearby, was surprised
by how the two went straight for
their target. “A common man would
have had difficulty in finding the place,
but these people knew every lane as if
they had studied the entire place.” The Chabad House, run by Rabbi Gavriel
Holtzberg, provided solace not just to
Israelis across the world and in the
country, but also to locals. On hearing
the hand grenade explode, the Rabbi
had called the police, but the terrorists
had managed to enter Nariman House
by then and took all nine of them
hostage. The Rabbi’s two-year-old son,
however, was lucky. His maid had taken
him to safety. Investigators probing the
Mumbai madness now believe that the
terrorists killed the nine hostages one by
one. Vicky Patil also helped bring the
bodies out, and says they were totally
decomposed, confirming what the NSG
Director JK Dutt was to say later — the
hostages were all dead before the commandos
went in to engage the terrorists
holed up in three different locations —
Taj, Oberoi and Nariman House.
BUT THE commandos were to
arrive only an entire night after
the bullets had been fired at
chosen targets. The NSG had been tasked
only two hours after the attack first
began and they would land in Mumbai
at 5am the next morning, board buses
that took an hour-long journey into
South Mumbai. The fire power of the
terrorists was by then tested by the
Marine Commandos (MARCOS), and they
had to retreat after groping in the dark,
stumbling over dead bodies littered in
the rooms and the corridors.
The Taj had been stormed through its
front entrance. The pair that walked up
from Leopold barged in through a side
door. The hotel management had been
sensitised to the possibility of an attack
and security had been beefed up — and
removed due to the inconvenience
caused to its guests.
The four unexpected, unwelcome
guests who arrived on the night of
November 26, fired indiscriminately in
the lobby, sending guests and staff scurrying.
The Taj was the last site to be
cleared and for a good three days, four
men held the vast building with 565
rooms, hostage. They had their AKs and
hand grenades with which to keep the
commandos at bay. They also liberally
poured booze from the minibars in the
rooms onto carpets and curtains. The
smoke was an effective tool to stall the
advancing soldiers.
Oskari Polcho, a young 19-year-old,
was one of the residents at the hotel. He
was coming out of a room on the second
floor when he saw the terrorist firing at
anyone they could spot. Before he could
grasp what was happening, he saw a gun
being aimed at him. Two bullets hit him — one lodged itself in his hand and the
other in his pelvis. “The terrorist thought
I was dead and proceeded to the other
rooms. I lay there bleeding till one of the
commandos knocked at my room,’’ a
shivering Polcho recounted.
Another pair had entered the Oberoi,
shot at the front desk and moved to their
left to Tiffin, a popular restaurant. A second
volley was fired here. They then
moved to Kandahar, where other guests
were dining. The restaurant manager
saw them coming and tried to shut open
the door. They shot the door, entered the
restaurant, took about 17 people hostage
and forced a restaurant employee to set
Kandahar on fire before ordering their
hostages all the way up to the 20th floor.
Somewhere in the middle of all this, one
of the guests managed to call his wife to
say there had been a shootout at the
hotel. She regrets not telling him she
loved him. That was the last time they
spoke. He was one amongst those who
were forced to line up against a wall in
the corridor before being mowed down.
Before they were killed, one of them
wanted to know why they were doing
this to them. Have you not heard of
Babri Masjid (demolished in 1992) and
have you not heard of Godhra (a reference
to the 2002 carnage in Gujarat) was
the cryptic reply. The terrorists, one at
the head of the queue and the other at the tail, had only to press the trigger.
SUNIL KUMAR, an NSG commando
who was on the second floor with
Major Sandeep Unnikrishnan
(later killed), was one of the first few to
encounter the terrorists. He thought he
had heard noises from Room 271. “They
don’t sound like they are coming from
civilians.’’ He was right. The door opened,
a silhouette with a gun appeared,
opened fire and retreated into the room.
Three bullets hit him and the Major
now had to escort him to safety. Major
Unnikrishnan did that but lost touch
with the other men in his team. He had
a tiny radio in his ear and could contact
his officers but to establish contact with
his team mates (the commandos work in
batches) he had to call out. The minute
he did that, he gave his position away. A
terrorist was lurking close by and it didn’t
take him a minute to spot the Major.
He, like Kasav and the others, had been
trained for close to a year.
The MARCOS who came in before the
NSG could do little. They could not even
gain access to the CCTV room because of
the billowing smoke. Trained in diving
and underwater operations, they were at
sea in the labyrinth of the Taj hotel, quite unlike the four terrorists who appeared
to know each stairwell and all its multiple
entries and exits.
KASAV’S ACCOMPLICES kept the
MARCOS and the NSG commandos
on their toes for nearly 60
hours; the NSG chief conceding that they
had to keep changing their strategies.
Landing on the roof was only the beginning
of a long ordeal. Manouevering the
floors and the rooms, especially where
frightened guests had locked themselves
in, was nerve wracking for people on
both sides of the door. The NSG commandos
did not know how many terrorists
were roaming the floors in the dark,
like they were. Checking each room was
a tension-filled and time-consuming
task. None of the guests holed up in
their rooms responded to the knock on
the door. They didn’t know who was
knocking. The calls of ‘we have come to
help you,’ sent guests behind writing
desks and into bathrooms. Each room
was opened with a spare key and it was
only after Dutt gave the thumbs up sign
at Taj and Oberoi did they realise that
200 of them had spent the better part of
three days neutralising six militants in
these two locations.
Nariman House, too, was held
hostage by just two men. The police had
evacuated nearby buildings as terrorists
opened fire from the window, killing bystanders
of the Nariman House. Later,
commandos jumped out of helicopters
and slithered down ropes to land on the
roof, but the Rabbi and his wife had
already been killed. Other bodies were
found with bullets on their foreheads —
they had been shot at close range.
The eight men — four at the Taj, two
at the Oberoi and two at Nariman
House, were not looking for escape
routes. Several kilograms of meat
that lay in Nariman House looked
untouched. The terrorists had brought
their own ration — high protein dry
fruit. They had come to kill and to add
numbers to the list of fatalities. The last
official count is 198 dead.
This does not include four guests who
had been been marched up to the 20th
floor from the Kandahar restaurant at
the Oberoi. They had fallen amongst the
heap of bodies, where they lay injured,
not dead, only to relive the horror of the
long siege. |